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Money Managers for Mankind? China in the Age of Global Governance, Part III

Money Managers for Mankind? China in the Age of Global Governance, Part III

By: Andrew Gavin Marshall

3 March 2016

Originally posted at Occupy.com on 9 February 2016

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This is the third article in a three-part series looking at China’s transformed role on the world financial stage. Read the first and second articles here.

In pursuing the strategy toward China of “integrate, but hedge,” the United States and its G-7 allies attempted to manage China’s global financial role, giving the world’s second largest economy a greater stake in the existing system while attempting to prevent alternative or antagonistic emerging market economies from gaining power.

However, due to the slow pace of reforms and their often disappointing results – case in point: the five-year delay of International Monetary Fund (IMF) reforms that would give China and other emerging economies greater influence in the Fund and World Bank – China has turned to creating its own development bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). And while China was developing the AIIB over the course of 2015, China was not only hedging its own bets – it was also advancing a strategy of “integration” on the monetary front. In the world of currencies, central banks and the global monetary order, China had an important year.

The main issue has been the inclusion of the Chinese currency – the yuan, or renminbi – in the elite basket of currencies managed by the IMF known as Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). Consisting of four of the world’s most traded currencies (the U.S. dollar, the euro, Japanese yen and British pound), the SDR is a currency unit whose value is weighted among those four currencies and used in IMF transactions between nations and central banks. But the real importance of the SDR basket is that it is a symbolic grouping of the few select currencies (and countries) that dominate the global monetary system. They are the most traded, saved and important currencies in the world, giving the countries and institutions that control them inordinate power in the global monetary and economic system.

China has lobbied for years to be included in the SDR basket, as both a sign of its global economic status and as a recognition of its new geopolitical power. But for China to be included, it needed to meet a number of criteria related to how easily tradable the currency is, how many central banks use the currency as a reserve asset, and whether or not interest rates are determined by market forces. Eswar Prasad, an economics professor at Cornell University who was previously the China country director at the IMF, commented that “this is ultimately going to be decided on political rather than economic merits.”

In laying the groundwork for inclusion, the IMF announced late last May that the renminbi was no longer considered to be “undervalued” – a long-held complaint of the IMF, United States and other G-7 nations that felt for such a large economy to maintain such a cheap currency gave it an overwhelming trade advantage, keeping its products cheaper and thus more competitive in international markets. Thus, the IMF’s declaration paved the way for consideration of the Chinese currency to be included in the SDR.

When the G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors met in Berlin in late May, they discussed the potential inclusion of the renminbi in the SDR basket. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble said that “it is desirable in principle” but “the technical conditions must be examined.” The G-7 countries continued to push China to reform its capital markets in order to increase its potential for inclusion. This pressured China to implement further market reforms to “liberalize” its financial markets, allowing for private financial institutions to play a larger role in managing the country’s economy (as opposed to being more state-directed and managed).

Earlier that same month, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), China’s central bank, approved roughly 30 foreign financial institutions to invest its domestic bond market, giving banks like HSBC, BNP Paribas, Société Générale, ING and Morgan Stanley greater access to the world’s third largest bond market (following the U.S. and Japan). China made moves over subsequent months to increase the access of foreign central banks and sovereign wealth funds to its bond market, as the country continued reforms that liberalized its economy. However, China still remained hesitant to adapt market forces too quickly or too fully that might have the effect of destabilizing the economy.

In August, the IMF recommended that while the renminbi should be added to the SDR basket, with a final decision to be made in November, the currency’s actual addition to the basket should not take place until September of 2016. This was in order to allow the country to implement further financial reforms and give banks, central banks and asset managers enough time to adjust their currency holdings to a slightly reformed monetary order. Some G-7 countries, such as Germany, France, Britain and Italy, favored a quick inclusion of the renminbi to the SDR, but Japan and the U.S. favored a more cautious approach.

Then, partway into August, China shocked global financial markets with a rapid currency devaluation – done partly to provide a boost to its own slowing economy – raising criticism from several countries that China was engaging in a currency war to lower the value of the renminbi in order to boost exports at the expense of other nations. However, because China’s currency is so closely tied to the U.S. dollar, as the dollar has risen in value over the past year or so, China’s currency has risen with it. This has put further strain on China’s economy and decreased its competitiveness relative to other global currencies whose value has declined relative to the rise of the dollar. That’s why, when China devalued in August, it explained the move as an attempt to move more towards a market oriented value for its exchange rate.

China was accused of currency manipulation due to its sudden devaluation, though it was in fact more accurately a response to the pressures from the manipulated changes in the value of the big currencies (U.S. dollar, Japanese yen and euro), which fluctuated in response to the winding down or ramping up of their respective Quantitative Easing (QE) programs. China managed to mute some harsher criticisms of its move by quickly announcing further market-oriented reforms to its financial and interest rate markets.

At a meeting of G-20 finance ministers and central bank governors in early September, U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew pressured his Chinese counterparts to continue the process of implementing market reforms, and specifically allowing markets a larger say in determining the value of the Chinese currency.

In mid-November, the IMF officially recommended that China be included in the SDR basket, which would “turn its currency into one of the pillars of international finance,” noted the New York Times. However, the final decision was to be made by the IMF’s Executive Board at the end of the month, where the G-7 countries have the power to pass or block any final moves. Following the IMF staff recommendation, China’s central bank announced that it would be implementing further reforms to allow markets more of a say in setting interest rates. And in late November, the IMF Executive Board voted in agreement to let the renminbi be included in the SDR basket, effective October 1, 2016.

Then, partway into December, China announced that it would begin to measure the value of its currency against a basket of 13 currencies instead of just the U.S. dollar. This would give the currency more room to fall in value relative to the U.S. dollar’s rise, and would give the country more “monetary independence” from the decisions and actions of the U.S. Federal Reserve. The announcement came just as the Fed was set to raise interest rates for the first time in nearly a decade, a move that would drive the U.S. currency even higher and put even more pressure on China as its economy continues to slow. In response, the Chinese currency hit a new four-year low against the U.S. dollar, increasing the country’s trade competitiveness.

The rise of China is one of the most important economic stories of the late 20th and early 21st centuries, and will continue to remain so. While the United States and the G-7 seek to “integrate, but hedge” their bets in bringing China into the structures of global economic governance, such as through inclusion into the SDR basket, China continues to pressure for greater political power commensurate with its economic weight, “hiding its brightness, biding its time.” But the time is increasingly present, visible with China’s founding of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), as a potential rival to the World Bank.

The integration of China into the structures and systems of global economic governance will have lasting ramifications. Not simply because it represents a shift from the dominance that the G-7 nations held over the global economy for the past four decades, but because the Chinese model of state-run totalitarian capitalism itself presents an alternative approach to constructing a market economy. As China increasingly becomes a part of the governing structure of the world economy, its model will gain increased influence. Indeed, if war and hostilities between the other great powers are to be avoided, the future of global capitalism may well rely on a combination of Western markets and institutions backed up by totalitarian institutions like the regime in Beijing.

Given that the capitalist system is experiencing a crisis in its legitimacy – with warnings from the head of the Bank of England, the IMF, and influential financial dynasties that the system is increasingly under threat due to its excesses – democracy may no longer be compatiblewith capitalism. And totalitarian state structures may be the only way to save capitalism from itself.

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“Hide Your Brightness, Bide Your Time”: China in the Age of Global Governance, Part II

“Hide Your Brightness, Bide Your Time”: China in the Age of Global Governance, Part II

By: Andrew Gavin Marshall

3 March 2016

Originally posted at Occupy.com on 2 February 2016

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This is the second article in a three-part series focusing on China’s transformed role on the world financial stage. Read the first part here.

One of the most important developments in the global economy over the past thirty years has been the integration of China into the global economic system and its governing institutions. The United States and the G-7, which collectively dominate these institutions, have managed the process in a slow, incremental fashion, allowing China a larger voice, greater representation and more authority in return for its implementation of reforms to further advance the market economy and allow Western banks and corporations greater access to the Chinese market.

But China, and other emerging market economies, have become increasingly frustrated with the slow efforts on the part of the G-7 nations and the institutions they control. With emerging economies, and notably China, accounting for such a large share of global economic growth and wealth, those countries feel increasingly underrepresented in international economic institutions and decision-making. Their international political power does not accurately reflect their international economic influence.

Integration and greater representation within the global economic architecture is designed to give emerging economies a greater stake in the international economic and political system, providing them with ownership and authority. However, if the process is too slow or the results too weak, emerging economies could potentially create their own parallel institutions and perhaps even (in the long term) construct a parallel or opposing economic system altogether.

China is the most important emerging market economy and the one at the forefront of this process of integration. The United States has for decades pursued a strategy toward China described as “integrate, but hedge.” In a nutshell, the concept is that it is imperative to bring China within the international system, but it must be done slowly and in a way that curbs China’s potential capacity to disrupt the system or existing power structures. However, such a strategy can backfire, for hedging bets can easily transform into antagonism, pushing China to adopt more aggressive responses and ultimately creating the circumstance such a strategy was supposed to avoid.

This process is evident in the development of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which came in response to the slow efforts by the U.S. to give China and other emerging economies greater representation and ownership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. In 2010, the IMF agreed to implement reforms to its governance structure and that of its sister institution, the World Bank – which is dominated by the U.S. and the G-7 – allowing several emerging market countries to gain increased shares and power within the 188-member-nation institutions.

But since the reforms were agreed in 2010 and ratified by virtually every nation in the world, only the U.S. has refrained, held back by a Congress that proclaims its wariness to give up any influence within the Fund. However, America would maintain its status as the top shareholder in the IMF and World Bank, while remaining the only one with veto power, and Japan would keep its position as the second largest shareholder. But the reforms would elevate China from the Fund’s sixth largest shareholder to third largest, putting it ahead of Germany, the United Kingdom and France.

Following years of delays in ratifying the IMF’s quota and shareholder reforms, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced in October of 2013 plans for the formation of “a new multinational, multibillion-dollar bank to finance roads, rails and power grids across Asia.” The so-called Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank would present a challenge to the role of the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), in which Japan and the U.S. are the two largest shareholders.

The U.S. was quick to pursue a strategy of containment and opposition to the proposed bank. As China was engaging in behind-the-scenes diplomacy with several Asian, European and other large nations around the world to gain support for the AIIB, the United States was lobbying its allies to oppose the bank and refuse to join its membership. China was meanwhile attempting to secure a roster of rich nations to join the AIIB as founding members and thus provide the development bank with much-needed capital. The U.S., however, was pressuring South Korea and Australia, among others, to reject the proposal and ensure that “membership in the bank would be limited to smaller countries, depriving it of the prestige and respectability the Chinese seek.”

At first, the U.S. lobbying and pressure seemed to work. When the AIIB was officially founded in late October of 2014, it had a membership of roughly 20 smaller countries along with China. The only other large nation to join was India. But in March of 2015, the UK defied pressure from the U.S. and announced that it would be joining the AIIB. U.S. officials weren’t pleased; one told the Financial Times that Washington was frustrated with Britain’s “trend toward constant accommodation of China.” This approach, said the official, “is not the best way to engage a rising power.”

Once Britain, a G-7 member, joined the AIIB, it led the way for other powerful and rich nations to do so. Within days, three other G-7 nations – Germany, France and Italy – all announced they were joining the bank. At the same time, Japan, China’s major competitor for economic, political and military influence in the region, said it was sticking by its major patron, the United States, and refused to join the AIIB. “The United States now knows Japan is trustworthy,” said Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

But the American strategy of opposition to the AIIB was not without its critics. Lawrence Summers, the former U.S. Treasury Secretary, former chief economist at the World Bank, and a top economic adviser to President Obama in his first term, wrote in the Financial Times that the U.S. decision to oppose the AIIB could represent “the moment the United States lost its role as the underwriter of the global economic system.” Summers wrote that “the global economic architecture needs substantial adjustment,” with the U.S. and G-7 nations needing to adapt to a world in which China was virtually the same economic size as the United States, and in which emerging market economies accounted for roughly half of global wealth.

The President of the World Bank, U.S.-appointed Jim Yong Kim, pledged to find ways to cooperate with the new Chinese-led development bank, as did the Japanese head of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Former World Bank President Robert Zoellick also wrote that U.S. opposition to the AIIB was “a strategic mistake.” Even President Obama in April suggested that the AIIB could potentially be a “good thing,” but stressed that it would have to adopt the standards set by U.S. and Western-controlled institutions like the World Bank.

In June of last year, former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke chimed in, saying, “The U.S. Congress is largely at fault for all that’s happening,” referring to the role of the legislature in blocking the ratification of the IMF’s reforms. Because of this, he explained, China and other countries have been increasingly looking to create their own regional institutions. “It would have been better to have a globally unified system,” said Bernanke.

By September, following a state visit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and President Obama at the White House, the U.S. formally announced “what amounts to a truce” over their opposition to the AIIB, with the U.S. saying it would stop lobbying against the institution in return for China agreeing to increase its financial contributions to institutions like the World Bank. However, both the United States and Japan continued to refuse to join the AIIB as members. At a joint press conference, President Xi said that “China is the current international system’s builder, contributor and developer and participant, and also beneficiary.” China was willing, he added, “to work with all other countries to firmly defend the fruits of victory of the second world war, and the existing international system.”

According to plan, the AIIB is to start with a capital base of $100 billion, and its ownership structure is designed to give countries in the Asia Pacific region roughly 75% of the voting shares, “giving smaller Asian countries a greater say than they have in other global organizations.” China provides the AIIB with nearly $30 billion of its $100 billion, giving its chief backer between 25% and 30% of voting shares and the only veto, since major decisions require a 75% majority.

The second largest contributor and shareholder is India, providing $8.4 billion, followed by Russia at $6.5 billion. Next is Germany with a $4.5 billion contribution, South Korea and Australia each providing $3.7 billion, with France and Indonesia each contributing $3.4 billion. Among the other large shareholders are Brazil, the UK, Turkey, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Iran, Thailand and the Netherlands.

The result: while the U.S. and Japan sit on the sidelines hedging their bets, the AIIB starts its place in the world of global economic governance with a membership of 57 nations from around the world. As former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping said several decades ago, “Hide your brightness; bide your time.” With the founding of the AIIB, China may very well be staking a claim on its time for greater power in the global economy.

“Integrate, But Hedge”: China In the Age of Global Governance, Part I

“Integrate, But Hedge”: China In the Age of Global Governance, Part I

By: Andrew Gavin Marshall

3 March 2016

Originally posted at Occupy.com on 26 January 2016

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This is the first article in a three-part series focusing on China’s transformed financial role on the world stage.

“Hide your brightness; bide your time,” cautioned Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of modern China who was the country’s supreme ruler from 1978 until the 1990s. Deng oversaw the “opening” of China into a modern state-capitalist society. He articulated a strategy for China’s integration into the global economic system – a strategy that progressed over the past four decades such that the world’s most populous nation is now its second largest economy, increasingly able to flex its new geopolitical and economic power and ambitions.

But China’s integration into the existing structures of global economic governance is not without risks and challenges. The country has grown economically as a result of slow, state-managed reforms to its economic system and the degree to which it has worked with the Western-created and -dominated economic system – in particular, those members of the Group of Seven (G-7) nations, the United States, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Canada.

The G-7 was established a few years prior to China’s economic opening, and in the subsequent four decades has been the prime driving force in shaping the architecture of the global economic system. As emerging market economies implemented economic reforms encouraged by the G-7 nations and the institutions they dominate, they demanded more representation and power within the institutions and structures of global economic governance. China is chief among the emerging market economies, and has been at the forefront of pushing for representation and influence in the global economy and its governing institutions.

The G-7 nations, and in particular the United States, have accepted that emerging markets and China need to be integrated into the existing structure, but the challenge has been to manage the process in a slow, incremental way that allows the G-7 to continue pressuring emerging markets into implementing further reforms while maintaining G-7 nations’ own position at the center of the system. For this reason, the Group of 20 (G-20) was created in the late 1990s as a meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors from the G-7 countries and several important emerging markets, including China.

Over the years and decades that China has implemented market reforms (albeit, managed by a totalitarian one-party state), the country has joined such institutions as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and gained elevated status within the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. However, its political, diplomatic and military power has also grown alongside its economic weight. East Asia, once the unquestioned domain of American and Japanese power, now has a new regional hegemon. This makes the imperative for China to integrate into the global economic architecture all the more imperative, as it would give the country a greater stake in the system as it exists, instead of potentially creating an alternative or rival system and institutions.

However, while integration is essential in the eyes of the West (and, indeed, in the eyes of many of China’s rulers, as well), it also carries immense risks. Unlike Japan, China is not dependent upon the U.S. for military protection and support, nor does it operate through a similar state democratic structure with which the industrialized world is familiar. Indeed, China and Japan are often antagonistic toward one another, a long product of Japan’s historical imperial war mongering and colonialism in the region. China has no desire to bow down to any outside power such as the U.S., nor submit to regional competitors such as Japan, and least of all does it intend to play second fiddle to any other power in its own backyard.

So, while there is a mutually beneficial economic relationship between China and the West, prompting the need for further integration into the structures of global economic governance, there is also a great deal of mistrust and uncertainty between China and the West, particularly on military and foreign policy matters. Historically, the rise of any new great power has always taken place in an environment of geopolitical tension and war. America, as the existing global hegemon, has designed its political and economic strategy toward China with these concerns in mind.

The American approach toward China was articulated, and in part designed, by the political scientist and former top U.S. government official and adviser Joseph Nye, as a strategy of “integrate, but hedge.” Nye, who formerly served in senior positions in both the State Department and Defense Department, is considered one of the most influential foreign policy intellectuals in the U.S. His influence extendsthrough multiple think tanks and advisory boards of which he is a member, including the Trilateral Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Aspen Strategy Group, and on advisory boards to the Defense Department and State Department.

Nye explained in The New York Times that in his role at the Defense Department in the 1990s, he helped develop the Pentagon’s East Asian Strategy Report, which identified three major powers in the region: the United States, Japan and China. It was at this time that the U.S. strategy of “integrate, but hedge” was designed, and it continued through the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations. Maintaining the U.S. alliance with Japan was central to the strategy, as it “would shape the environment into which China was emerging.” The objective was “to integrate China into the international system,” which included joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), but Nye added: “We needed to hedge against the danger that a future and stronger China might turn aggressive.”

In the Fall of 2011, high ranking members of the Obama administration began making clear that U.S. grand strategy envisioned an increased focus and presence in the Pacific Asian region. Writing in Foreign Policy in October of 2011, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explained that the U.S. was implementing “a strategic turn to the region” to maintain “peace and security” and “open markets.” Such a strategy would “secure and sustain America’s global leadership.” Clinton wrote that the U.S. relationship with China was “one of the most challenging and consequential bilateral relationships the United States has ever had to manage” which “calls for careful, steady, dynamic stewardship.”

In November of 2011, President Obama declared the “pivot” to Asia was a “top priority” for the United States. “The United States is a Pacific power and we are here to stay,” said the President, though he claimed that it was not a strategy designed to “contain” China. “We’ll seek more opportunities for co-operation with Beijing,” he said. “All our nations [of the Pacific region] have a profound interest in the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China.”

Thomas Donilon, President Obama’s National Security Advisor from 2010 to 2013, described the same strategy toward China while speaking to an audience at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in November of 2012. One of the central elements of the pivot to Asia, explained Donilon, was “pursuing a stable and constructive relationship with China.” America’s relationship with China “has elements of both cooperation and competition,” and U.S. policy was designed “to seek to balance these two elements in a way that increases both the quantity and quality of our cooperation with China as well as our ability to compete.” The U.S. had made clear, he said, “that as China takes a seat at a growing number of international tables, it needs to assume responsibilities commensurate with its growing global impact and its national capabilities.”

Another component of the pivot to Asia was to advance the region’s “economic architecture,” which meant a stronger engagement with regional forums and multilateral institutions, and notably advancing the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a regional ‘trade’ deal driven by the United States to “deepen regional economic integration.” The Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement was finalized in 2015 as a “21st century trade agreement” between the United States, Canada, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei. The agreement was largely viewed by America’s allies as “a counterweight” to China’s regional and global economic and political ambitions.

The Financial Times described the TPP as the “economic backbone” of the U.S. pivot to Asia, writing that, “the goal for the U.S. and Japan is to get ahead of China… and to create an economic zone in the Pacific Rim that might balance Beijing’s economic heft in the region.” As President Obama said: “When more than 95 percent of our potential customers live outside our borders, we can’t let countries like China write the rules of the global economy. We should write those rules.”

So while the United States continues to “write the rules” of global economic governance as it pursues its decades-long strategy of “integrate, but hedge,” China appears to still be following the original advice of Deng Xiaoping: “Hide your brightness, bide your time.” Time will tell.

 

After “Landmark” IMF Reforms, U.S. Is Still the Group’s Unrivaled Economic Power

After “Landmark” IMF Reforms, U.S. Is Still the Group’s Unrivaled Economic Power

By: Andrew Gavin Marshall

12 November 2015

Originally posted at Occupy.com on 5 November 2015

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The International Monetary Fund is one of the three pillars of the global economic system, the other two being the World Bank and the World Trade Organization. And the importance of the IMF cannot be overstated, with its membership of 188 nations (a few less than the membership of the United Nations) and its responsibility to “aid” countries in economic crisis needing loans. The IMF applies strict conditions in return for its assistance, and as such, it has been one of the most influential institutions in the management, maintenance and evolution of the world economic order.

Due to its central role in global financial governance, the management and power structure within the Fund itself reflects the power of some of the IMF’s individual member nations in the wider global economy. The United States, as the largest and most powerful economy in the world, was not only the primary architect of the IMF but remains its largest single shareholder – the only nation with veto power over the Fund’s major decisions.

The IMF was founded in 1944 and officially launched in 1946 with a membership of just over two dozen nations. During the following years and decades its membership grew rapidly. The Fund’s governance structure includes a Managing Director and deputies who are supported by an Executive Board and a Board of Governors. The Board of Governors consists of the finance ministers or central bank governors of the IMF’s member nations, who meet twice a year at the Spring and Annual meetings of the Fund and World Bank, providing national political authority to the direction and decisions of the Fund.

The Executive Board, on the other hand, consists of 24 representatives, usually mid-level bureaucrats from their respective national finance ministries or central banks, who serve at the Fund overseeing its day-to-day operations in close cooperation with the Managing Director. While the Board of Governors reflects the entire membership of the IMF, power at the Fund is not the same as at the United Nations, where one nation gets one vote. Instead, the IMF has a constituency system whereby individual nations are part of larger groups that collectively elect a representative from among their ranks to serve on the Executive Board.

For example, one constituency on the IMF’s Executive Board consists of 23 different African nations who collectively hold 3.34% of the IMF’s voting shares. Most of that influence is controlled by just two nations in the constituency, South Africa and Nigeria. Another African constituency on the Executive Board consists of 23 nations with a collective voting power of 1.66%. This means virtually all of sub-Saharan Africa, representing some 46 nations, has approximately 5% of the voting power within the Fund.

On the other hand, there are nations that do not represent a larger constituency, yet their IMF quotas and voting shares are so great that they have a permanently appointed representative on the Executive Board. The top five shareholders today are the U.S. with 16.74%, Japan with 6.23%, Germany with 5.81%, and France and the United Kingdom with 4.29% each. China, Saudi Arabia and Russia have their own permanent seats on the Executive Board; Canada and Italy are also among the top 10 shareholders in the Fund.

In other words, the major shareholders are the Group of Seven (G-7) nations along with three major emerging market and strategically significant countries. But this was not always so.

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Division of Power

In the early 1960s, the largest five shareholders with permanent seats on the Executive Board of the IMF were the U.S., United Kingdom, France, West Germany and India. By 1971, Japan had joined the list and moved above India. The so-called Group of Five (G-5) nations dispatched finance ministers and central bankers who held secret meetings several times a year to steer the global economy.

Quota and governance reforms took place over the years that followed, with countries increasing the amount of money they paid into the Fund and the amount of votes they held over IMF decisions. But the top five largely remained the same. By 1983, Saudi Arabia was added as a sixth member of the group with an appointed director. This composition was maintained into the 1990s, though the pecking order changed (by 1999 Japan had risen to second place, with Germany third and France and the U.K. tied at fourth and fifth).

Not until 2010 did the Group of Twenty (G-20) finance ministers and central bank governors agree to reforms in the quotas and voting shares of the IMF, seeking to increase the participation and ownership of major emerging market economies. The aim was to maintain the legitimacy of the IMF in an era when roughly half the world’s GDP growth was coming from emerging and developing nations. Yet the representation and power of those nations in international institutions remained largely locked in the era of the 1970s. The 2010 reforms, while agreed upon, have still not been implemented due to U.S. Congress’s refusal to ratify them. Virtually every other IMF member nation has ratified and agreed to the reforms, and even the U.S. administration has pushed for the reforms, but Congress remains reluctant due to fears of a perceived loss of U.S. influence over the Fund.

The reality is that the changes in governance of the IMF keep the U.S. as the largest shareholder and still the only one with veto power, though it increases the ownership of emerging market economies, in particular those represented in the membership of the G-20. According to the data of quotas and shares, here is a list of the top 35 shareholders of the IMF, both before and after the 2010 reforms:

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In the pre-2010 phase, which still exists at present, the top 10 shareholders are all of the G-7 nations plus China (at 6th place), Saudi Arabia (8th) and Russia (10th). After the reforms are implemented, the U.S. stays at number one, Japan stays in 2nd place, but China moves up to 3rd place followed by Germany, the U.K., France and Italy. Then comes India, Russia and Brazil, with Canada kicked off the top 10 list at number 11. Saudi Arabia has also been kicked off the top 10, following Canada at number 12.

When the G-20 reached agreement in 2010 on the IMF reforms, it was hailed as a “landmark” deal to give developing countries more power and say in the operations of the Fund, with then-Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn calling it “a very historic agreement.” British Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne said at the time of the initial agreement, “We have pulled off major reform of the IMF so it properly represents the balance of economic power in the world.”

The reality, however, is that while China, India and Brazil made significant gains due to the reforms, the overall distribution of power within the Fund remains relatively unchanged. Prior to the reforms, the G-7 nations (U.S., Germany, Japan, U.K., France, Italy and Canada) collectively held 43% of the IMF’s voting shares. After the reforms, the G-7 nations will hold approximately 41% of the voting shares of the IMF. Overall, the G-20 nations (which include the G-7, plus Australia and 11 major emerging market economies) collectively account for 63% of voting shares prior to the reforms, and nearly 65% after the reforms.

Even with these relatively minor changes, the U.S. Congress has failed to pass the reforms, leading the IMF and G-20 nations to seek other “interim solutions” and ad-hoc arrangements until America ratifies the changes. But the hesitation of the U.S. has already had major repercussions, as China founded its own international economic institution, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), threatening U.S. dominance of such international organizations.

Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers wrote an op-ed in which he said the U.S. failure to ratify the IMF changes cleared the way “for China to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.” Summers wrote that “with China’s economic size rivalling America’s and emerging markets accounting for at least half of world output, the global economic architecture needs substantial adjustment.”

As history has shown, international institutions are slow to adapt to changes in the global economy, and even slower to adapt to changes in their governance structures. While the U.S. is concerned about maintaining its place at the center of global economic governance, through its inaction and inability to adapt quickly or with substance, it puts its own position at threat and creates the impetus for other nations to create alternatives.

The U.S. has stood at the center of the world’s financial system for roughly 70 years, but there is no reason to assume it will remain there. In an age-old example of national hubris, America’s drive to maintain its centrality – and uncontested power – in the global economy may lead to its eventual replacement.

When the IMF Meets: Here’s What Happened At the Global Plutocracy’s Pow Wow in Peru

When the IMF Meets: Here’s What Happened At the Global Plutocracy’s Pow Wow in Peru

By: Andrew Gavin Marshall

26 October 2015

Originally posted at Occupy.com

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On October 6, the finance ministers, central bankers and development ministers from 188 countries convened for the Annual Meeting of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in Lima, Peru. The yearly gathering is one of the top scheduled events on the calendar of economic diplomats, bringing them together for private discussions, seminars and press conferences with journalists. And of course it’s a big deal for the thousands of private bankers and financiers who are there to cut deals with the chief financial policymakers in those 188 IMF-member nations.

It was ironic that this year’s meeting took place in Peru at a time when emerging market economies are experiencing increased economic problems: the result of a combined slow-down in economic growth in China, a collapse in commodity prices, and threats by the U.S. Federal Reserve to hike interest rates in the near future. Indeed, talk of China, interest rate hikes and emerging market crisis was plentiful in Peru. Central bankers, unsurprisingly, came out generally in favor of raising rates, with top monetary officials from emerging markets saying they more feared the uncertainty about when rates would rise than the rise itself, and urged the Fed to simply get on with it.

Global Pow Wow

The annual meetings bring together the Board of Governors of the IMF, made up of the central bankers or finance ministers from the Fund’s 188 member nations. But the Governors are given their marching orders from the 24-member International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC), made up of ministers and central bank governors from the 24 major constituencies represented on the IMF’s Executive Board, and whose membership largely reflects that of the Group of Twenty (G20).

The IMFC held their meeting in Lima on Oct. 9, presided over by the committee’s chairman, Agustin Carstens, the Governor of the Central Bank of Mexico, and the IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde. In attendance were the finance ministers of Japan (Taro Aso), India (Arun Jaitley), Argentina (Axel Kicillof), Brazil (Joaquim Levy), France (Michel Sapin), Italy (Pier Carlo Padoan), Germany (Wolfgang Schauble), Singapore (Tharman Shanmugaratnam), Great Britain (George Osborne) and the United States (Jack Lew), along with top-level central bankers from Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Norway, Algeria, Colombia, Belgium and China.

Also participating in the IMFC meeting were Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board (FSB); Jaime Caruana, General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS); Valdis Dombrovskis, Vice President of the European Commission; Angel Gurria, Secretary-General of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank (ECB), and other top representatives from OPEC, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

These various financial diplomats met and made prepared statements, but the real work and decision-making took place in the IMFC’s off-the-record discussions. These discussions also included, as usual, a joint meeting between the IMFC and the G20, after which the G20 held a press conference discussing recent agreements made by the world’s top economic diplomats collectively representing roughly 85% of global GDP.

The meetings followed the consistent hierarchy of operations among the world’s most powerful economies, starting with a private gathering of the finance ministers and central bankers from the Group of Seven (G7) nations, including the U.S., Germany, Japan, UK, France, Italy and Canada. This was followed by a gathering of ministers and monetary chiefs from the G20 nations (consisting of the G7 plus China, Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa, Argentina, Australia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, South Korea, Indonesia and the European Union). The heads of the world’s major international organizations also attended these meetings, functioning effectively as a steering committee for the global economy. The G20 then held a joint session with the IMFC, which functions as the steering committee of the IMF.

The IMFC’s communiqué following its meeting warned that global economic growth was “modest and uneven” with increased “uncertainty and financial market volatility.” Risks to the global economy “have increased,” it noted, in particular for emerging markets.

Apart from the IMFC and G20, a number of other important meetings took place on the sidelines of the annual gathering, many of which prominently featured bankers. One of the most important gatherings of global financiers was the Annual Membership Meeting of the Institute of International Finance (IIF), a consortium of roughly 500 global financial institutions including banks, asset managers, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, hedge funds, central banks, credit ratings agencies and development banks.

From Oct. 9-10, the world’s top bankers and financiers then held luncheons and private meetings with the world’s top economic policy-makers, who were also invited to attend or speak at the conference proceedings. The IIF’s opening ceremony was addressed by Peru’s President Ollanta Humala Tasso, and included guest speakers like the finance minister of Indonesia and central bankers from Thailand and Malaysia, as well as the top Swedish central banker, Stefan Ingves, who serves as chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) which is responsible for shaping and implementing global banking regulations known as Basel III.

On the second day of the IIF’s meeting, guest speakers included top officials from Brazil’s finance ministry, the World Bank, and a keynote address was delivered by the governor of Canada’s central bank, Stephen S. Poloz. The rest of the day included talks by finance ministers and central bankers from Colombia, Chile and Peru; a top official from the central bank of France; and an official from the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which is a group of global central banks, finance ministries and regulators responsible for managing stability of financial markets.

Another important gathering in Lima was the Group of Thirty (G30), presided over by its Chairman Jean-Claude Trichet, the former President of the European Central Bank. The G30 was established in 1978 as a nonprofit group of roughly 30 sitting and former central bankers, finance ministers, economists and private bankers, with the aim “to deepen understanding of international economic and financial issues” and “to examine the choices available to market practitioners and policymakers.”

Among the G30’s current members are former Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker; Mark Carney of the Bank of England and Financial Stability Board; Jaime Caruana of the BIS; Mario Draghi of the ECB; William C. Dudley of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; former U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner; former Bank of England Governor Mervyn King; economist Paul Krugman; Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda; Bank of France Governor and BIS Chairman Christian Noyer; Reserve Bank of India Governor Raghuram Rajan; Tharman Shanmugaratnam of Singapore; former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers; Chinese central banker Zhou Xiaochuan; and top bankers from UBS, JPMorgan Chase, BlackRock and Goldman Sachs.

This year, the G30 held its annual International Banking Seminar in Peru, “an invitation-only, off-the-record forum that allows for frank discussion and debate of the thorniest issues confronting the central banking community,” bringing together “over fifty percent of the world’s central bank governors, the Chairmen and CEOs of the financial sector, and a select few academics to debate financial and systemic issues of global import.”

The meeting included a short speech by Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer, who told the audience that the Fed’s interest rate rise was “an expectation, not a commitment.” Fischer acknowledged that “shifting expectations concerning U.S. interest rates could lead to more volatility in financial markets and the value of the dollar, intensifying spillovers to other economies, including emerging market economies.” He reassured his audience, however, that the Fed will “remain committed to communicating our intentions as clearly as possible… to assist market participants, be they in the private or the public sector, in understanding our intentions as they make their investment decisions.”

Behind Closed Doors

But the true importance of the annual IMF meetings is not what happens in formal proceedings and seminars, but the various secret meetings of finance ministers, central bankers and private financiers that take place on the sidelines of the official conference. In these closed-door events, a select group of government and monetary officials, primarily those from the G7 and G20 nations, were invited to wine and dine with bankers at decadent dinners and lavish parties, and speak to private gatherings of the world’s top investors and money managers. It’s here, in these various meetings, where the world’s chief financial diplomats were able to meet, greet and receive praise or criticism from their true constituents: the global financial elite.

As usual, the annual pow wow of the global plutocracy came and went with little comment outside the financial press. But as always, the annual IMF meetings – and the more secretive, simultaneous gatherings of global economic diplomats and financiers on the sidelines – represented the core of global economic governance, manifest in the various ad-hoc committees that in essence rule the world.

These individuals’ main interactions were not with the populations in their home nations – the people who suffer under austerity, who have to “adjust” to the restructuring of their societies into “market economies” – but rather with those from whom they have the most to gain: bankers, billionaires and financiers. And rest assured, when the officials retire from their central bank and finance ministry positions, they will be stepping out of their membership in the G7, G20 and IMFC, and into the boardrooms of JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, BlackRock, Barclays and Deutsche Bank. They will be well rewarded, with large salaries and bonuses for a job well done while in public office. And the revolving door of global economic governance will keep turning.

A Year in the World-Traveling Life of U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew

A Year in the World-Traveling Life of U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew

By: Andrew Gavin Marshall

Originally posted at Occupy.com 

15 October 2015

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Jacob Joseph (“Jack”) Lew is one of the two most powerful financial diplomats in the world, the other being his central banking counterpart, Janet Yellen, the Chair of the Federal Reserve Board. As the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Lew has been the most important economic official inside the Obama administration since his confirmation in February 2013 following the president’s re-election.

Prior to serving as Treasury Secretary, Lew was White House Chief of Staff to President Obama from 2012 to 2013, and Director of the Office of Management and Budget from 2010 to 2012, a position he also held in the Clinton administration from 1998 until 2011. Lew was also Deputy Secretary of State under Hillary Clinton from 2009 to 2010. But from 2006 to 2008, he worked at Citigroup, overseeing the bank’s $1.8 billion in wealth management assets, and was then appointed as one of Citi’s senior executives.

Lew’s appointment to Citigroup was made on the recommendation of the bank’s then-Chairman Robert Rubin, the former Treasury Secretary from the Clinton administration (1995-1999), with whom Lew worked closely. When Lew left the bank to join the Obama administration immediately following the 2008 financial crisis and the billions in bailouts his bank received, Lew got a bonus of almost $1 million from Citigroup on top of his more than $2 million in regular earnings from the bank.

Tracking Lew’s Movements

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In examining the role played by the Treasury Secretary to shape U.S. and global economy policy, it’s revealing to look at his schedule over the course of a year. After reviewing Secretary Lew’s schedule of phone calls and meetings in 2014, it’s easier to understand what it means to be one of the world’s most powerful financial diplomats. More than any other high-level official, Lew was in consistent contact with Yellen, having held over 30 phone calls or meetings with the Federal Reserve Chairperson over the course of the year, which included regular lunch or breakfast meetings.

As the two top diplomats and managers of the American economy and the U.S. dollar, it makes sense for these two individuals to meet frequently, both to assess the economic outlook and to devise a common U.S. position at international meetings – like the bi-annual meetings of the IMF steering committee known as the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC), as well as the secretive meetings of finance ministers and central bankers of the Group of Seven (G7) and Group of Twenty (G20) nations.

Officially founded in 1976, the G7 sits at the center of global economic governance, meeting at the head of state level once a year, and holding multiple meetings and conference calls among the finance ministers and central bank governors of nations that comprise its membership: the U.S., Germany, Japan, France, UK, Italy and Canada. The G20, on the other hand, was founded as a meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors in 1999, and only started meeting at the head of state level in late 2008 in the midst of the global financial crisis.

Jack Lew was in frequent contact with his G7 peers, including all of the finance ministers and most of the central bankers. In addition to the gatherings of the G7 and G20, Lew spoke or met with German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble roughly 20 times throughout 2014. In the same period he met or spoke with the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, roughly 16 times; with European Central Bank (ECB) President Mario Draghi some 15 times; and with Japanese Finance Minister Taro Aso 14 times.

Secretary Lew also had extensive contact with French Finance Minister Michel Sapin and his predecessor Pierre Moscovici, who became European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs; Italian Finance Minister Pier Carlo Padoan; Canadian Finance Minister Joe Oliver; and Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), an institution that brings together central bankers, finance ministers and regulators to oversee the global management of financial markets. Lew spoke or met with Carney some 12 times throughout the year.

But apart from Yellen, the high-level official with whom Lew had the most contact was Christine Lagarde, the Managing Director of the IMF and a former French Finance Minister; Lew met or spoke to Lagarde roughly 23 times in 2014, including at the meetings of the G7 and G20, which the IMF Managing Director typically attends.

The G20 has a much wider membership than the G7, though it includes all of the G7 nations in addition to Australia, the European Union, and major emerging market economies such as China, India, Brazil, Russia, Mexico, Turkey, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Indonesia and South Korea. The heads of major international organizations like the IMF, World Bank, Bank for International Settlements (BIS), World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also typically attend the meetings of the G7 and G20.

Following Yellen, Lagarde and Schauble, Secretary Lew was most frequently in contact with Australian Treasurer Joe Hockey, with whom he met or spoke roughly 17 times throughout the year. While Australia is not even a member of the G7, it would typically seem odd to have such extensive communication between its Treasurer and the U.S. Treasury Secretary. But Australia was hosting the G20 meetings in 2014, and thus Hockey closely coordinated with Lew on meetings that involved financial officials convening four times during the year.

Another name that stands out is Tharman Shanmugaratnam, the Singaporean Finance Minister who held nine separate calls and meetings with Lew, and 13 including those of the G20. Shanmugaratnam became Finance Minister of Singapore, a wealthy Asian city-state, in 2007, and has also held the dual role as head of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), the country’s central bank. In addition, Tharman serves on the board of directors of Singapore’s large sovereign wealth fund, GIC, which manages between $100 and $350 billion in assets, including significant stakes in Citigroup and UBS, Switzerland’s largest bank.

The likely reason why Lew had such frequent contact with Shanmugaratnam – the chief financial diplomat of a country that is neither a member of the G7 nor the G20 – is because in March of 2011, Shanmugaratnam was appointed Chairman of the IMF’s steering group, the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC), made up of finance ministers and central bank governors from the nations represented on the Fund’s Executive Board.

Lew attended the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January of 2014, where he held private bilateral meetings with Mark Carney of the Bank of England (and FSB), Saudi finance minister and central bank governor Ibrahim Al-Assaf, ECB President Mario Draghi, and Mexican Finance Minister Luis Videgaray, who was another emerging market diplomat with whom Lew had frequent contact throughout the year (eight separate phone calls and meetings, or 12 including those at the G20).

In February, Lew traveled to Australia for the first G20 meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors under the chairmanship of Australian Treasurer Joe Hockey. Lew moderated a session of a conference hosted by the Institute of International Finance (IIF) and held private meetings with German Finance Minister Schauble, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister and top financial diplomat Ali Babacan, and Japanese Finance Minister Taro Aso. And just before the official G20 meetings began, the G7 countries got together for a quiet one-hour meeting as well.

As the Spring Meetings of the IMF were starting in April, Jack Lew held private meetings with Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, Videgaray of Mexico, Draghi of the ECB, Saudi Finance Minister Al-Assaf, and Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega. Once again, Lew attended a private one-hour gathering of the G7 ministers before attending a wider G20 meeting of ministers and central bank governors on April 10. The following day, Lew attended the joint G20-IMFC meeting, and continued with G20 meetings for the rest of the day.

In September, Lew once again traveled to Australia for a special meeting of G20 financial diplomats, during which time Germany served as host for a private lunch meeting of the G7 finance ministers and central bank governors. He returned to Australia in November for the main head-of-state summit of the G20, where he privately met with his counterparts from Saudi Arabia, China, France, Japan, and with Mark Carney of the FSB.

As the chief financial diplomat from the most powerful nation and economy in the world, Jacob Lew is the central figure among G7 diplomats with whom he is in frequent contact, while closely coordinating with the chairs of the G20, the IMFC, and the heads of international organizations like the IMF and FSB. Through these and other groupings, Treasury Secretary Lew sits at what can only be understood as the absolute center of global financial diplomacy and governance.

Meet the Secretive Committees that Run the Global Economy

Meet the Secretive Committees that Run the Global Economy

By: Andrew Gavin Marshall

8 October 2015

Originally published at Occupy.com

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There exists an overlapping and highly integrated network of institutions, committees and secret meetings of ad-hoc groups that collectively run the global economy. This network consists of finance ministries, central banks, international organizations and the various conferences and confabs that bring them together. This network is responsible for facilitating global financial diplomacy and managing the architecture of global financial governance. In short: it is the most powerful and informal political structure in the world.

With the United States at the center of the system, the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve Bank are the two most important American institutions in global financial governance – and the Treasury Secretary and Federal Reserve Chairperson are the world’s two most powerful financial diplomats. Both institutions are headquartered in Washington, D.C., just down the street from the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Group, two global financial bodies created in 1944 to manage the world economy on behalf of the rich Western nations that founded them.

Twice a year, the IMF and the World Bank host large international conferences. The Spring Membership Meeting, typically held in April, and the Annual membership meeting draw a crowd consisting of most of the finance ministers and central bank governors from the IMF’s 188 member nations, representing the Fund’s Governing Board. They descend on D.C. where the meetings are typically held (though occasionally they are hosted in other countries as well), and draw scores of journalists, academics and thousands of bankers and financiers who are eager to meet, greet, wine, dine and make deals with the political decision-makers of the global economy.

The top five shareholders of the IMF (United States, Japan, Germany, France and U.K.) reflect the membership of an ad-hoc group of finance ministers that began meeting in 1973, thereafter known as the Group of Five (G-5). At the time, U.S. Treasury Secretary George Shultz described the group as “a channel for informal and very frank communication on monetary and other issues, both of a long-term and more immediate character.” But the G-5 was hardly the first of such groups.

In 1962, the Group of Ten (G-10) was formed as a meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors from the rich industrial nations, including the U.S., West Germany, Japan, France, U.K., Italy, Canada, Belgium, Sweden, Netherlands (and eventually Switzerland, although the name remained the same). The G-10 would meet alongside the leaders of the IMF, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).

Following the U.S. unilateral decision to end the Bretton Woods monetary system in 1971, a series of committees and groups were established to provide forums for major economies of the world to negotiate forming a new monetary system, and to integrate developing economies into the institutional apparatus of global financial governance. The Group of Ten was utilized as one such forum.

In 1972, the G-10 laid the groundwork for the establishment of a special Committee of 20 to be formed within the IMF, whose membership reflected the composition of the IMF Executive Board, but at the ministerial level – giving it a much higher level of political authority than the board, which is composed of mid-level officials from their respective national finance ministries. The committee would include most G-10 members alongside several developing country representatives, and was formally institutionalized in late 1974 as the “Interim Committee” of the IMF.

(Although the Group of Five was formed in 1973, it wasn’t until 1975 that it held the first meeting at the head of state level, with the addition of Italy to the group. The following year, Canada was invited to participate, and thereafter it was known as the Group of Seven (G-7), effectively functioning as the steering committee for the global economy.)

Fast forward to the mid-1990s, when the G-7 nations instructed the Group of Ten to consult with emerging market economies on ways to reform the global financial architecture in cooperation with major international organizations like the IMF, World Bank, OECD, and BIS, which were increasingly opening their membership and ownership positions to large emerging market economies.

The idea was thus: If developed countries give developing countries a stake in the existing system, they won’t use their new-found wealth and power to oppose that system. And all the while, the West was to remain at the center. Through crisis and collapse and “rescue” efforts led by the IMF, BIS and World Bank, developing and emerging market economies were encouraged to accept Western economic “advice” on how to manage their economies. If they wanted bailouts in the form of loans from international institutions, those countries had to follow conditions that demanded a total restructuring of their economies and societies along G-7 lines – designed to transform them into modern “market economies” capable of integrating into the larger global economy.

The groundwork was laid out over the following years, and in the course of 1999, the IMF’s Interim Committee was reformed into the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC). The G-10 organized several seminars involving major emerging market economies and, together with the G-7, formed a new group known as the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), a meeting group of central bankers, finance ministers and regulators who were handed responsibility for maintaining financial stability in the world. Finally, 1999 also saw the organizing efforts of the G-7 result in the formation of yet another forum, the Group of Twenty (G-20).

The G-20 was born in December of 1999 at a meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors from the G-7 nations, along with Russia, China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, Australia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, Argentina and the European Union. The event was attended by top officials from the IMF, World Bank and the European Central Bank. But despite all the international noise, the G20 was largely the initiative of two men: Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin and U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers.

The G-7, or G-8 once Russia was invited in, remained the main forum for global economic leadership. But in the midst of the global financial crisis in 2008, the G-20 was the group convened by U.S. President George W. Bush, who brought together heads of state for the first meeting that took place in Washington on November 15. That meeting produced an agreement among G-20 nations to pump trillions of dollars into their economies in order to bail out their banking systems.

In 2010, then-President of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet, explained at a meeting of the Institute of International Finance (IIF) that the G-20 had emerged “as the prime group for global economic governance.”

Speaking to a crowd of hundreds of the world’s most powerful bankers and financiers, Trichet explained, “Global economic governance embraces supranational institutions – such as the IMF – as well as informal groupings – such as the G-7 and the G-20. Both are necessary, and both are complementary.” Trichet praised the evolving system as “moving decisively towards a much more inclusive system of global governance, encompassing key emerging economies as well as the industrialized countries.”

To this day, the hierarchy of global economic governance follows a familiar pattern. Take the IMF’s meetings, where 188 of the world’s finance ministers and central bankers meet. The International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) holds a meeting, functioning as the steering committee to the Fund. And prior to IMFC meetings, the G-20 finance ministers and central bank governors hold a series of meetings, including a joint meeting with the IMFC, as they already have a significant crossover of membership.

But before the G-20 meets, the ministers and governors of the G-7 nations typically meet privately for an hour or so, attempting to form a common position or strategy in dealing with the wider groupings of the G-20 and IMFC, in which all G-7 nations are represented at the ministerial level. The chiefs of the world’s major international organizations (IMF, World Bank, OECD, WTO, BIS) participate in almost all of these meetings, acting as advisers to and receiving high-level political direction from these groups.

The hierarchy of global economic governance emanates out of the United States, in close cooperation with Germany, Japan and the other members of the Group of Seven. From there, it networks through the Group of Twenty and the IMFC, which in turn collectively function as the steering committee for the world’s major international organizations, and act as the board of directors of the global economy.